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The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty
Nicole Huberfeld *
INTRODUCTION
Fragmentation has aptly described the United States’ historically
decentralized, disjointed, and disintegrated approach to health care.1 While
fragmentation has endured in multiple dimensions—political, economic,
organizational, relational, regulatory, and philosophical, to name a few—the
exclusionary characteristic of American health care facilitated by fragmentation
has been one of the greatest hurdles to access to needed care. Private health care
providers have defended their prerogative to treat whomever, whenever, and the
law largely has protected them from systemic integration 2 in either care or finance
that could facilitate more “unified decision making.” 3 Moreover, the United States
has lacked a unifying theory of access to health care, existing in an ordered chaos
sustained by a century-long political rejection of collective response to the human

* H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law and Bioethics Associate, University of Kentucky College
of Law. Thanks to the participants in the Law of Medicare and Medicaid at 50 Symposium and to
Jessica Roberts for helpful insights. Comments are welcome: nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu. Thanks
always DT and SRHT.
1. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) (essays
examining the “fragmented” healthcare system and prescribing institutional changes to eliminate
fragmentation).
2. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care about Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix
It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 1-6 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) (discussing
various dimensions of fragmentation). Applying economic theory of “firms and team production,”
Professor Elhauge discusses the deeply entrenched institutional problems of fragmentation:
[H]ealth care raises the mother of all team production problems where input
contributions are difficult to measure. . . . [I]n health care, shirking is likely to consist of
failing to coordinate with others involved in the team effort on strategy, timing, and
information-sharing in order to maximize health benefits per costs expended. . . . U.S.
health care couples the mother of all team production problems with the mother of all
refusals to use centralized ownership structures to solve them . . . .
Id. at 7. Both law and politics have protected health care providers from engaging in the
integration commonly proposed during health care reform efforts that could facilitate a systemic
approach. For example, Medicare’s enabling statute began with assurance to physicians that the
federal government will not interfere in the practice of medicine. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
3. Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1 (defining fragmentation as “having multiple decision makers make
a set of health care decisions that would be made better through unified decision making”).
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need for care through unitary health reform. 4
The harmful effects of exclusion have been well studied and documented, but
exclusion has remained an entrenched feature of American health care.5 As a result,
individuals have always been excluded from health care based on various measures
unrelated to their actual need for medical care, such as ability to pay, employment,
parental status, or race.6 Even those covered by the nation’s medical safety net—
Medicaid—could only enroll if they were deemed “deserving” of governmental
assistance. However, in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) created universal access to health insurance, facilitated through a federal
takeover of health insurance law. 7 The ACA shifted the law away from state-based
private law to federally-based public law, shunned exclusion, and began to
embrace a concept of health care as a public good, one that is inclusive and
leveling. This shift started occurring incrementally through various federal laws
over the years, but prior legislation rendered relatively small changes, and none
universalized access to health care or health insurance until the ACA was enacted.
In short, Congress legislated a new approach to health care through the ACA:
universality. 8
The ACA’s statutory design of universal access to health insurance was a

4. For a discussion of historic health care reform successes and failures leading to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, see PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION pt. I-II (2011)
[hereinafter STARR, REMEDY].
5. Andew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults, 99 AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 2289, 2291-94 (2009) (finding that over 45,000 people die each year due to access issues
resulting from uninsurance). See generally INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE
TOO LATE (2002) (documenting how lack of insurance coverage creates barriers to access to health
care that have measurably detrimental effects on health).
6. Even Medicare, the politically popular social insurance program for the elderly, is rooted in
the individual’s prior employment status. Americans must work in jobs that pay into the social
security system for forty quarters to qualify for Medicare at age sixty-five, or they may pay premiums
to access Medicare Part A (which typically does not require premiums). Because Medicare has
permitted buy-in for people legally present in the United States, it is significantly less exclusionary
than Medicaid; the point here is simply that work status has been a determinant of health care access
in the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012).
7. Not truly universal, as not every person within United States borders is eligible for health
insurance. The largest excluded population is undocumented immigrants, who are excluded from
Medicare, Medicaid, and exchanges through which insurance can be purchased. See, e.g., Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1323(f)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184 (2010)
(excluding unlawful residents from access to insurance through exchanges). Medicaid covers
emergency services that hospitals provide to undocumented immigrants, but they cannot enroll in
Medicaid by receiving such services, unless the state in which the patient seeks care has opted to
cover pregnant women and children who are undocumented. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2012).
8. See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of
the Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 1 (2014) [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts,
Great
Society],
http://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Huberfeld.pdf
(analyzing universality as a civil right for Medicaid beneficiaries).
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propitious step toward addressing the persistent exclusion facilitated by
fragmentation in health care. 9 For example, private health insurance markets and
practices have been rendered more uniform and inclusive by the ACA. But, the
most important changes arguably have been effectuated in Medicaid, because it is
no longer limited to certain categories of qualifying people or illnesses. The law of
Medicaid is now inclusive rather than exclusive, because the ACA as written
rendered all people earning up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) eligible
to enroll. This relatively simple statutory modification was a metamorphosis for
the program that enrolled only the “deserving poor” for its first forty-nine years. 10
This essay explores how the law of Medicaid at fifty creates a meaningful
principle of universalism by shifting from fragmentation and exclusivity to
universality and inclusivity. The universality principle provides a new trajectory
for all of American health care, one that is not based on individual qualities that
are unrelated to medical care but rather grounded in non-judgmental principles of
unification and equalization (if not outright solidarity). To that end, this Essay first
will study the legislative reformation that led to universality and its quantifiable
effects. The Essay then will assess and evaluate Medicaid’s new universality
across four dimensions, namely governance, administration, equity, and eligibility.
Each reveals a facet of universality that underscores this new principle’s
importance for health care into the future.
I. FROM FRAGMENTATION TO UNIVERSALITY
The United States has sustained a fragmented health care system that has
excluded many people from both health insurance and health care. When other
countries adopted social insurance or socialized medicine under the philosophy of
solidarity after World War II, Americans rejected it, instead opting to continue the
employer-provided private insurance apparatus encouraged by federal tax

9. The ACA built on the existing structure of hybrid public/private insurance to achieve
universal coverage. The majority of Americans will access insurance through their employers, by
virtue of a penalty placed on large employers who do not offer affordable health insurance benefits,
or through purchasing private insurance on health insurance exchanges with premium assistance for
people earning 100% to 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The elderly and permanently
disabled are still covered by Medicare. The poor are covered by Medicaid; and, as this essay
discusses, Medicaid will cover all of the poor earning up to 138% of the FPL for the first time in
Medicaid’s history. Thus, the ACA maintains fragmented insurance coverage through large, small,
and individual markets as well as through private and public plans, but it also unifies insurance
customs through federal rules that make all Americans insurable and that prohibit insurance practices
that made some people uninsurable through, for example, preexisting condition exclusions and other
discriminatory practices. For a deeper explanation of the ACA’s architecture, see STARR, REMEDY,
supra note 4, at 239-46.
10. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444-53 (2011).
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benefits. 11 The employment-based private health insurance design excluded a large
proportion of Americans, namely those who were elderly, poor, or otherwise
outside worker-focused health insurance mechanisms. Historically, the elderly and
poor were assisted by state-based medical welfare programs, but by the 1950’s,
states could not cover everyone who could not afford health care for lack of
insurance. It was no secret that the elderly and the poor were bankrupted by their
encounters with medicine, and state safety nets often failed for lack of funds,
political support, and budgetary shortfalls.
When Congress enacted Medicaid, it aided some of those individuals who
were excluded from health insurance by virtue of their poverty, but Medicaid’s
coverage was far from universal. Medicaid was a program for those outside of the
private care, private insurance realm, and despite being part of the Great Society’s
push for legislative civil rights, Medicaid eligibility depended on the dual
characteristics of being both poor and within states’ historic, welfare-related
definition of “deserving.” 12 For the first forty-nine years of its existence, Medicaid
never covered more than half of the poor because the program only protected low
income Americans who were also pregnant women, children, blind, disabled,
elderly, or deemed medically indigent. 13 Due to the ACA, however, Medicaid has
become available to anyone who financially qualifies,14 which had been proposed
but was never passed. 15 This Part documents the move from fragmentation to
universality, grounding its analysis in the universal coverage Medicaid now
provides.
A. Medicaid’s Statutory Transformation
Medicaid was created at the same time as Medicare, but the political capital
was invested in creating social insurance for the elderly, who successfully lobbied
for a national, universal health insurance program in Medicare.16 The safety net for

11. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 235-89 (1982)
[hereinafter STARR, TRANSFORMATION].
12. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 46-47 (1974).
13. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently Unstable,
38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 332 (2012) (discussing Medicaid’s coverage limitations).
14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a), 124 Stat. 119,
271-75 (2010). The companion legislation, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
(HCERA) of 2010, added a 5% income disregard, effectively raising new Medicaid eligibility to
138% of the FPL. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, § 1004(e), 124 Stat. 1029, 1036.
15. STARR, REMEDY, supra note 4, at 105, 175 (describing prior plans to expand Medicaid to
deal with the uniquely American problem of the uninsured).
16. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 12, at 53.
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the remainder of the poor was an afterthought. 17 By many accounts, no one
expected Medicaid to last very long in its dual governmental, exclusionary
structure. 18 Medicaid was a continuation of the Kerr-Mills program, which
provided federal funding to the states to continue their medical assistance to the
poor. 19 The Medicaid Act created a stronger federal framework, and Congress
intended to ensure that states provided minimal economic security to the needy
who qualified. But, even with strengthened federal rules, many decisions were left
in the hands of the states, continuing fragmentation through patient exclusion and
disunified administration that existed in health care long before Medicaid was
enacted. 20
While Medicaid offered generous federal funding to states and created a
federal regulatory superstructure that states had to accept to receive funding,
decisions about eligibility and provision of medical care echoed states’ preexisting
medical welfare programs. This meant that the stigmatizing concept of the
“deserving poor” was carried forward into Medicaid, so only a limited portion of
the poor would be eligible to enroll. 21 Also, limiting Medicaid to the deserving
poor meant that “able bodied” adults were not eligible unless a state opted to spend
its own funds on them, with no federal match. Medicaid’s safety net clearly was
not intended to catch everyone. Further, due to categorization of the poor to qualify
for Medicaid, beneficiaries were marked as poor and either deserving or
undeserving, isolating them from the rest of the population who received health
coverage through private mechanisms. 22 Even though Medicaid was supposed to
funnel the neediest into mainstream medicine, in many ways it sustained fractured
medical care by virtue of its welfare-related stigma and such signifiers of lower
status as the minimal reimbursement rates states paid to participating providers.23

17. See generally Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 444 (detailing Medicaid’s path dependence).
18. Rosemary Stevens & Robert Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 348, 420 (1970) (predicting that Medicaid would be quickly “phased out”).
19. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 12, at 51.
20. Before Medicaid, states provided medical welfare to indigent patients who fit within the
deserving poor categories. The states could not afford to provide medical welfare when the Great
Depression hit, and from the passage of the first Social Security Act through 1965, the federal
government provided more money and more rules to the states to support medical welfare programs.
Each state had its own rules regarding medical welfare, though the provision of benefits to only the
deserving poor was remarkably consistent. See Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 436-44 (discussing
medical welfare programs that predated Medicaid).
21. Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 439-40 (illuminating the deserving poor standard).
22. DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY 29-30, 39 (2010).
23. Id. at 47. Before Medicaid, the uninsured had few choices for health care. Many availed
themselves of the care available in emergency departments under Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act’s (EMTALA) strictures. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (requiring all hospitals that accept
Medicare and that have emergency departments to treat anyone who presents with an emergency
condition). Because many hospitals were nonprofit and tax-exempt, some indigent uninsured
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Those who could qualify for Medicaid found that they were treated as “others,”
and those who were not eligible often were not treated at all.
Over time, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility 24 by requiring states to
provide comprehensive medical coverage to children under age twenty-one; 25 to
expand coverage of the aged, blind, and disabled; 26 to expand eligibility standards
for pregnant women and for children; 27 and to financially support drug coverage
for people enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid after the Medicare drug benefit
was enacted. 28 Due to many small expansions through the years, Medicaid now
financed the most health care of any payor, public or private, in the health care
sector. 29 Even so, Medicaid excluded childless, non-elderly, non-disabled adults
from its funding for most of its existence.
In 2010, Congress enacted another eligibility increase through the ACA,
which required states to count as eligible everyone under age sixty-five earning up
to 133% of the FPL. Thus, the ACA abandoned long-standing exclusion of nonelderly childless adults by making any low-income citizen (or legal resident)
eligible to enroll in Medicaid. The ACA eliminated Medicaid’s qualifying
categories for purposes of eligibility (though not for other administrative
purposes), 30 rejecting old judgments regarding who is “deserving” of medical

received charity care that was absorbed by hospitals or written off as bad debt by hospitals. See
generally Lisa Kinney Helvin, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-For-Profit Hospitals Doing Their
Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421 (2008) (discussing failure of nonprofit hospitals
to provide adequate charity care and the result of such failures). But, many uninsured Americans who
would not have been classified as indigent attempted to pay their medical debts and filed for
bankruptcy in so doing because hospitals charged full, non-negotiated prices to private pay patients.
See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates
over Healthcare Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001)
(presenting the third part of an empirical study showing that medical costs were the primary source
of individual bankruptcy).
24. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing Medicaid expansions).
25. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §§ 301-02, 81 Stat. 821, 92129 (1967) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
26. Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat. 1329,
1370-74, 1465-78 (1972) (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
27. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 302, 102 Stat. 683,
750-51 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(l) (2012)).
28. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
29. Medicaid Moving Forward, KAISER FAM. FOUND., (2014) [hereinafter Medicaid Moving
Forward], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/7235-07-medicaid-movingforward2.pdf.
30. Under the Social Security Amendments of 1965, the different categories of qualifying poor
have varying qualifying levels of earnings as well as options states can exercise to cover more
categorically poor at higher earning levels; for example, the median coverage level for pregnant
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assistance and starting movement toward the policy of inclusion that is
universality. The post-ACA Medicaid shed its Elizabethan trappings, 31 inviting all
comers to find security in its coverage.
In NFIB v. Sebelius, 32 the Supreme Court effectively rendered the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion optional for states, but, paradoxically, neither the ACA’s nor
Medicaid’s statutory language was struck down or modified. The Court’s unusual
administrative remedy for its conclusion that the expansion was unconstitutionally
coercive slowed the process of Medicaid expansion, because the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services could not penalize states that choose
not to expand eligibility. But, the law of the Medicaid expansion that created the
principle of universality was untouched. Whether states immediately expand
Medicaid to the newly eligible or not, 33 universality is a statutory policy change
that will have multiple, potentially long-lasting effects.
One obvious and immediate effect is the increase in coverage that is the
inevitable result of expanding eligibility, regardless of state choice to opt in or out
of expansion. Medicaid was already a key program for certain populations, but the
expansion will have the effect of spreading Medicaid patients across the health
care sector. Because they are no longer labeled worthy or unworthy of medical
assistance, Medicaid patients will not be limited to the obstetrics unit, long term
care, or pediatricians’ offices. The infiltration of Medicaid patients throughout the
health care sector will facilitate integration for the Medicaid population. The next
subsection studies the numbers behind Medicaid’s universality for both
historically covered populations and the newly eligible to understand the
implications of eligibility expansion in the context of universality.
B. Universality in Medicaid by the Numbers
A significant proportion of Americans will enroll in Medicaid to access
medically necessary health care at some point in any given year—as many as one
in four when the Medicaid expansion is completed. But, even before 2014,
Medicaid covered approximately 20% of Americans, and for pregnant women,
children, and the elderly, Medicaid was already ubiquitous. 34 As of 2010, Medicaid

women is 185% FPL, which combines the 133% FPL mandatory coverage level with state options
to cover women at higher levels of income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012).
31. See Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 439.
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
33. For a study of the federalism dimensions of Medicaid expansion, see Tom Baker, Abbe R.
Gluck, Nicole Huberfeld & Theodore Ruger, The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and
Theoretical Assessment of How Federalism Has Changed in Health Care and Beyond (forthcoming
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511003.
34. See Medicaid: A Primer: Key Information on the Nation’s Health Coverage Program for
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covered 48% of all births in the United States 35 and nearly two-thirds of all
unintended pregnancies. 36 Non-pregnant and childless women have not qualified
for Medicaid and many have been uninsured. With the Medicaid expansion,
approximately 4.6 million women of reproductive age will become eligible for
Medicaid, which will increase the percentage of births covered by Medicaid as
well. 37 Medicaid also has covered more than half of all complex deliveries, though
that number may decrease after expansion because women are likely to become
healthier due to the preventive care they will receive as part of the newly eligible
population. 38
As of 2013, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP),
which are separately funded but often have unified operations, provided health care
coverage to more than 37% of all children under eighteen. 39 Public coverage of
children has been extensive and especially concentrated among the approximately
20% of children who live in families earning less than 100% of the FPL.40 For
example, 73% of children in families earning less than 100% of the FPL are
covered by Medicaid/CHIP, 41 and 45% of children in families earning between

Low-Income People, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 8, (2013) [hereinafter Medicaid: A Primer],
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334-05.pdf.
35. Anne Rosier Markus et al., Medicaid Covered Births, 2008 Through 2010, in the Context of
the Implementation of Health Reform, WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES, Sept.-Oct. 2013, at e273–e280,
http://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(13)00055-8/pdf. This rate is high in part because
states have historically increased income eligibility levels for pregnant women and in part because
poor women have less access to birth control and higher rates of unintended pregnancies. See id. at
e274; Medicaid: A Primer, supra note 34, at 9.
36. Adam Sonfield et al., The Public Costs of Births Resulting from Unintended Pregnancies:
National and State-Level Estimates, 43 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 94 (2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga & Rachel Arguello, Children’s Health Coverage:
FAM.
FOUND.
(2014),
Medicaid,
CHIP
and
the
ACA,
KAISER
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/8570-children_s-health-coveragemedicaid-chip-and-the-aca1.pdf.
40. Carmen DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States:
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
14
(2014),
2013,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.
Children are proportionally overrepresented in the low-income population: “Children represented
23.5 percent of the total population and 32.3 percent of people in poverty.” Id.
41. Children who are eligible may not be enrolled if their parents are not also eligible; this is a
different aspect of the welcome mat effect that the ACA would have because newly covered parents
would have the knowledge and incentive to enroll both themselves and their already eligible children
in Medicaid. See, e.g., Genevieve M. Kenney et al., A First Look at Children’s Health Insurance
Coverage under the ACA in 2014, URBAN INST. 2 (2014), http://hrms.urban.org/briefs/ChildrensHealth-Insurance-Coverage-under-the-ACA-in-2014.pdf; see also Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica
Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as Social Insurance, 46 U. TOLEDO L. REV.
[hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical Perspective] (forthcoming 2015),
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100-250% of FPL are enrolled, but only 16% of children in households earning
between 250-399% of FPL are Medicaid enrollees. 42 Medicaid will now cover
more children aged five to eighteen, whom prior to the ACA were only covered up
to 100% of the FPL. Estimates are that about 600,000 children enrolled due to the
ACA in 2014, 43 and predictions indicate that millions more will be covered when
hold out states opt in to Medicaid expansion given the concentration of uninsured
children in the South. 44
Many people over age sixty-five will require institutional long-term care,45
which Medicare reimburses only when skilled nursing is required; consequently,
Medicaid has been funding at least 40% of all long-term care costs in the United
States. 46 That means Medicaid finances care for more than 60% of long-term
nursing home residents, despite their Medicare coverage 47; in some states, that
number is higher. 48 Neither the ACA nor Medicaid expansion will change this
coverage much, given that expansion is concentrated in people under sixty-five.
Non-elderly people who become disabled are eligible for Medicaid, and they have
been included in Medicaid’s long-term care coverage for decades. While the ACA
facilitated experimentation with community-based long-term care rather than
institutionalized care, long-term care coverage was not radically reformed by the
ACA. 49 As such, it contributes to Medicaid’s universality going forward because
it was already so important for the elderly and disabled populations.
Covering only the “deserving poor,” Medicaid provided health care coverage
to more than one in five Americans before the ACA, 50 and the Congressional

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532495.
42. RUDOWITZ et al., supra note 39.
43. Recent Trends in Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment: Analysis of CMS Performance Measure
Data through August 2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 4 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/recenttrends-in-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-analysis-of-cms-performance-measure-data-issue-brief.
44. See, e.g., Joan Alker et al., Uninsured Children 2009-2011: Charting the Nation’s Progress,
GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 4-5 (2012),
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Uninsured-Children-2009-2011.pdf.
45. DONALD REDFOOT & WENDY FOX-GRAGE, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., MEDICAID: A PROGRAM
OF LAST RESORT FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 1 (2013) (stating that
seven out of ten people turning sixty-five will need long-term care at some point in their lives).
46. Medicaid: A Primer, supra note 34, at 4.
47. Id.
48. See 155 CONG. REC. E2468, E2469-70 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009) (statement of Rep. Mike
Rogers attaching letter by Gov. Charlie Crist, dated September 17, 2009) (describing Medicaid as
financing long term care for both seniors and disabled people).
49. Community-Based and Long-Term Services and Supports, MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/affordablecareact/provisions/community-based-long-term-services-andsupports.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
50. For deeper discussion of the demographics of Medicaid’s enrollment, see Huberfeld &
Roberts, Great Society, supra note 8; Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical Perspective, supra note 41.
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Budget Office estimates the number of new Medicaid enrollees at more than
eighteen million by 2018 and another two million by 2024, which will increase
Medicaid’s enrollment to one in four Americans. 51 In addition to covering over
half of all pregnancies, more than a third of all children, and well over half of all
long-term nursing home residents, previously excluded low-income parents and
childless adults who cannot obtain health insurance through employers will now
be included in Medicaid’s medical assistance.
Of the newly eligible adults, most are either the working poor or employees
of small businesses, as uninsured adults generally fall into two categories: workers
who are self-employed or work for small companies that cannot offer insurance
benefits, or those in low wage jobs that do not offer insurance or that do not offer
affordable insurance. Among newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries, 79% have at
least one worker in the family, with 63% in full time employment and 16% in part
time employment. 52 Many of the newly eligible are workers who want health
insurance but are not offered it or cannot afford it, and Medicaid now acts as the
employment benefit of health insurance that wealthier workers have enjoyed since
the 1940s.
In short, Medicaid covers more lives than any other health insurance
mechanism in the United States, and it has surpassed Medicare in enrollment and
total spending. 53 The statutory philosophy behind that increase was a federal policy
choice to include all Americans in health insurance coverage so that they are no
longer excluded based on individual characteristics or subject to the physical and
economic insecurity of inconsistent health care access. 54 The universality
encompassed by this policy choice is broader in some respects than social
insurance because it is not grounded in work status (in contrast to Medicare, large
group, and small group insurance). Medicaid is now a de facto form of social
insurance in our health care system given that it is covering a substantial portion
of the working poor. But, it also covers those who cannot work, cannot find work,
or are unable to work, and it provides more thorough grounding in access to health

51. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, CONG. BUDGET OFF 58 (2014),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf
(“By
2024, about 89 million people will be enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.”).
52. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2, 4, (2013),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/8488-key-facts-about-the-uninsuredpopulation.pdf.
53. Medicaid Moving Forward, supra note 29, at 1.
54. President Barack Obama, On Behalf of My Mother, Remarks at the Signing of Patient
Protection
and
Affordable
Care
Act
(Mar.
23,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/23/behalf-my-mother (“And we have now just enshrined,
as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some basic security when it
comes to their health care.”).
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care than insurance coverage that is linked to worker status. It is less fragmentary
and more equalizing than employment-based insurance, which makes it an
important source of economic and social stabilization for low income workers. The
principle of universality has bypassed the resistance to solidarity that stymied
health care reform for many years, and instead of being “phased out,” Medicaid
has embodied this new legislative principle. 55
II. UNIVERSALITY IN FOUR DIMENSIONS
Medicaid’s expansion to capture individuals who historically have fallen into
gaps enlarged by fragmentation demonstrates a move from exclusivity to
inclusivity in the American health care system. Yet, non-exclusion contains
important ramifications beyond enrollment. This part explores four dimensions of
universality—governance, administration, equity, and eligibility—that provide
useful lenses through which to consider the multi-layered implications of
universality.
A. Universality in Governance
Medicaid has long been considered a classic cooperative federalism
program. 56 To the Supreme Court, this has meant that the federal government can
drive policy with large sums of money, but it cannot force states to partner in
Medicaid. 57 To the federal government, this has meant that Congress occasionally
drives health care policy forward by expanding Medicaid eligibility or medical
coverage, and then HHS negotiates with the states to enforce the reform. To the
states, this has meant large transfers of federal funding that help to balance state
budgets by covering indigent patients while states engage in diverging and largely
uncontested interpretations of the Medicaid Act.
In addition to these inter-governmental dynamic negotiations, Medicaid has
been partially privatized by waiver. The ACA ushered in negotiations with HHS
to expand eligibility, rendered more aggressive on states’ part by the holding in
NFIB v. Sebelius. Each of the expansion-related waiver requests thus far contains
a privatization element, whether by placing newly eligible enrollees in qualified
health plans in the exchanges, or by funneling the newly eligible into Medicaid

55. See Stevens & Stevens, supra note 18, at 420.
56. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).
57. See, e.g.,Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-07 (Roberts, C.J., holding the Medicaid expansion as
written in the ACA unconstitutionally coercive because the states could not choose whether to expand
their categories of eligibility without losing all of their Medicaid funding).
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managed care plans, or by seeking a health savings account format for them. 58
Medicaid has been a hybrid program, weaving together federal and state policy
and administration, public and private systems, and the deserving poor with others
in the health care system. HHS’s authority to grant section 1115 waivers, which
provide states with flexibility in Medicaid and other programs governed by the
Social Security Act to create demonstration programs, always has included the
ability to authorize privatization, but the federal/state, public/private hybrid has not
been subject to the universality backstop until now. The multifaceted policy
implementation in Medicaid could be deemed an example of new governance,59 or
it could be viewed as a facet of heath care fragmentation.
Over time, federal rules have increased in the Medicaid program, and the
states often have pushed back against greater federal superstructure. 60 While this
dynamic is a gripping study in modern federalism, experimentation often occurs
for budgetary reasons and not for the benefit of Medicaid enrollees. States need
federal funding to provide medical assistance, but they often reject or attempt to
bypass the federal rules that come with copious funding for political reasons.
Medicaid is the largest transfer of wealth from the federal government to the states
in American history. But, the states remain part of Medicaid’s administration for
path dependent reasons—they have always been involved in welfare medicine, and
so they remain involved in welfare medicine. This bifurcated governance is
inefficient both administratively and economically and is exacerbated by states’
slow path to expansion, which prolongs exclusionary policy in opt-out states.
HHS has been expending tremendous effort negotiating with states in the
wake of NFIB v. Sebelius to convince them that they should expand Medicaid
eligibility and to consider their various proposals for demonstration waivers. 61 If
the program were fully federalized, as I have discussed elsewhere, 62 expansion
would be complete by now. HHS administrators could instead spend time on
administering the program rather than negotiating with reticent, self-serving states

58. See Baker et al., supra note 33.
59. See THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 15 (Lester M.
Salomon ed., 2002) (offering a way station between “command and control” governance and pure
privatization through a negotiated management format).
60. For example, the National Governors Association has a standing policy statement regarding
health care that demands both “proper[]” federal funding and safeguarded state “flexibility.” National
Governors
Association,
NGA
Policy
Position
HHS-05
Health
(2013),
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-policy-positions/page-hhs-policies/col2content/main-content-list/health.html (adopted at NGA’s Winter 2013 meeting).
61. See, e.g., Nathaniel Weixel, Burwell Urges Hesitant Governors to Work with HHS on
Medicaid Expansion, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Nov. 4, 2014 (reporting on
Secretary Burwell’s remarks to the fall meeting of the National Association of Medicaid Directors
that invited any state interested in Medicaid expansion to talk with her).
62. See generally Huberfeld, supra note 10.
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who hold out for political purposes. Allowing states to maintain a co-governance
role in Medicaid is not supported by finance or by medical standards. 63
Universality provides a developing legislative structure that informs HHS’s
management of Medicaid in its negotiations with states, and it can provide a new
direction for Medicaid’s governance by clarifying the national government’s role
in public health insurance, which is already substantial. The ongoing reliance on
states in health care governance should be reconsidered in light of the principle of
universality. While some states have accepted the new federal law of Medicaid as
their guide for Medicaid enrollment, the continued role of states creates a tension
with the goals of health care reform by slowing Medicaid expansion for political
purposes. Governance viewed through the lens of universality supplies another
reason that the experiment of the states is no longer appropriate in Medicaid.
B. Universality in Administration
The principle of universality provides a new path for battling administrative
fragmentation in health care. Health care in the United States has been
decentralized in decision-making, delivery, finance, information sharing, and other
ways. Medicaid has been a particularly exaggerated form of fragmented
administration, because each state creates its own structure for complying with the
federal Medicaid Act. Although the Medicaid Act has provided a baseline for states
regarding standards for medical welfare, the program has allowed huge amounts
of state variation within the federal rules so long as states have not provided less
(on paper) than the federal statute requires. 64
While some aspects of Medicaid historically have been unwaivable—such as
eligibility and enrollment for people who meet the terms of the Medicaid Act,
statewide benefit consistency, and freedom of choice among health care providers
participating in Medicaid—states have been able to designate for HHS how they
will comply with the many aspects of the Medicaid program with little pushback
so long as the state’s plan was budget neutral. 65 States have often divided different
categorically eligible enrollees into more or less deserving categories. For
example, every state has chosen to increase the income level at which pregnant
women will be covered. But, only some states have provided benefits to parents of

63. See id. at 743-49.
64. See generally John Holahan, Variation in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical
Expenditures: How Much Is Too Much?, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY (John Holahan, Alan
Weil & Joshua M. Wiener, eds. 2003).
65. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Section 1115 Waivers, MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/section1115-demonstrations.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
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eligible children above the level dictated by the Medicaid Act. 66 These options and
inconsistencies make for overly complex administration at both federal and state
levels, as well as inequitable medical coverage for enrollees (discussed further
below).
HHS cannot manage each state at a granular level.67 Only when it is quite clear
that a state is running afoul of the Medicaid Act does HHS confront a state
regarding compliance. Further, HHS never pulls state funding, because its policy
goals are different from a state’s—HHS wants to ensure that bodies are in the
program, getting covered for as much health care as possible, while states
habitually are using federal funding to balance their budgets. 68 Each state makes
some individualized decisions regarding the medical coverage of its Medicaid
population, the payment rates for health care providers who participate in the
Medicaid program, and the way that the state will contract with managed care
entities that will cover the state population. These decisions, to which HHS
generally defers, have created a fifty state patchwork of Medicaid benefits,
eligibility, and rules that renders the Medicaid program quite fragmented,
especially if an enrollee ever changes residency.
This highly decentralized approach to Medicaid makes health care for lowincome citizens administratively inefficient. 69 This aspect of fragmentation creates
wildly varying standards of health care access and care that impact patient care.
For example, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recently issued an
evaluation entitled State Standards for Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care,
in which the OIG appraised each state’s Medicaid managed care contracting and
found state oversight of quality control and access to care lacking. 70 Not only did
many states fail to set standards for access to care, but also the OIG stressed that
HHS must “strengthen oversight” of the program to ensure protection of enrollees

66. Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits for Adults at Application, as of August 28, 2014, KAISER
FAM. FOUND.(2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-income-eligibility-limits-foradults-at-application-2014 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
67. See generally Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012), (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10283), 2011 WL 3706105.
68. See, e.g., Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, STATES’ USE OF MEDICAID
MAXIMIZATION STRATEGIES TO TAP FEDERAL REVENUES: PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES, URBAN INST. (2002), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310525_DP0209.pdf.
69. See Randall R. Bovberg et al., State and Federal Roles in Health Care: Rationales for
Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 25, 44 (John Holahan, Alan Weil &
Joshua Wiener, eds. 2003); Marilyn Moon, Making Medicaid a National Program: Medicare as a
Model, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 325, 330 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua Wiener eds.,
2003).
70. Suzanne Murrin, State Standards for Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care, DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-11-00320.pdf.
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when state administration fails. 71
The theory of universality can simplify Medicaid’s administrative morass.
Although HHS has conciliated states in the interest of policy entrenchment and
increased health care access through maximizing the lives covered, HHS now must
exercise greater control in the administrative choices and procedures in Medicaid.
HHS is responsible for directing and monitoring states’ compliance with
universalism. Though NFIB v. Sebelius limited HHS’s authority to enforce state
participation in Medicaid’s expansion, once a state does signal interest in eligibility
expansion, HHS has a stronger hand to play. State proposals that could diminish
the inclusivity of Medicaid expansion should not be entertained, and HHS could
do much to centralize the multitudinous state decisions to ensure the basic care for
Medicaid beneficiaries is not full of gaps.
While universality does not speak directly to these internal administrative
issues, and the NFIB spin on universality has complicated Medicaid administration
temporarily because of the subsequent executive branch invitation to negotiate
through waiver proposals, ultimately, universality will furnish a backstop to state
requests for flexibility through welfare-like “experiments” with requirements that
are unrelated to health care. Proposals such as work-search requirements are not
only outdated in light of the principle of universality, but they also increase the
need for administrative oversight and further diversify it by virtue of the tailoring
required of such requests. Other requirements, such as wellness programs or copayments enforceable for portions of the newly eligible population, also can
increase administrative complications due to increased diversification of state
Medicaid programs, which are harder for the limited HHS staff to manage. 72
HHS must enable enrollment in Medicaid in order to entrench the new federal
policy of universality, but it cannot do so at the expense of enrollees’ health status,
which is jeopardized when states take a laissez faire approach to Medicaid
administration. Now that universality has detached Medicaid from old
stigmatizing, disequalizing, welfare-like conditions, the states should not be
permitted to negotiate new welfare conditions into the expansion, which only
complicate administration of the program. While the negotiations between HHS
and the states display a blazingly dynamic federalism, which is both vertical and
horizontal, that federalism is not necessarily of value to enrollees, especially
without assurance that HHS will provide real oversight as states negotiate, respond,
and react. 73

71. Id. at 17-20 (instructing the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a sub-agency of
HHS, to increase oversight of state managed care programs).
72. See generally Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2013),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8416.pdf.
73. See Baker et al., supra note 33.
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C. Universality in Equity
Upon enactment in 1965, one clear goal for Medicaid was to mainstream
eligible beneficiaries into the medical care available to everyone else. Over the
past fifty years, America’s fragmented health care system has facilitated continued
segregation for people of means in private insurance and people who are low
income, whether uninsured or in Medicaid. 74 It is widely understood that the
uninsured do not have consistent access to health care and that they delay care or
do not receive needed care due to cost. 75 Thus, the greatest health care inequity
currently exists for low income populations in states that have not yet expanded
their Medicaid eligibility standards. Until those states expand, Medicaid’s
inclusivity is thwarted, and people will not receive medically necessary care due
to lack of insurance coverage. The holdout states correlate strongly to the states
that have high Medicaid federal matching rates and high levels of uninsurance,
raising questions about the political theater being staged in the opt out states.
Yet, once enrolled in Medicaid, enrollees still can experience difficulty
finding health care providers who will accept them as new patients. 76 This inequity
in access and care could increase instability as expansion progresses over the next
several years. Some doctors are unable or unwilling to treat Medicaid patients, and
Medicaid beneficiaries sometimes face obstacles in finding basic preventive
services. 77 While this may result in part from Medicaid patients residing in
medically underserved areas, Medicaid patients in health care rich environments
reportedly experience some under-service as well. 78
The ACA attempted to address inequitable access by increasing Medicaid’s
primary care physician payments to Medicare levels for 2013 and 2014, and some
evidence indicates that the increased payments drew physicians into Medicaid who

74. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003).
75. See, e.g., Health Insurance and Access to Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/factsheet_hiac.pdf; COMM. ON HEALTH INSURANCE
& ITS CONSEQUENCES, INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH
AND HEALTH CARE (2009).
76. The Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) report on state oversight of managed care for
Medicaid populations discussed this problem to a degree. See STATE STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO
CARE IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 70, at 8-14 (discussing findings that states do not
ensure adequate access to physicians); see also Robert Pear, For Medicaid Enrollees, Access to Care
Is Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2014, at A26 (discussing the OIG report).
77. See, e.g., Sandra L. Decker, Two-Thirds of Primary Care Physicians Accepted New
Medicaid Patients in 2011−12: A Baseline To Measure Future Acceptance Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF.,
1183, 1184-86 (2013) (discussing various physicians’ willingness to accept new Medicaid patients).
78. See, e.g., Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next Challenge—Securing Primary Care for
Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 493 (2011).
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would not ordinarily have participated. 79 But, without congressional action or
voluntary state continuation, this reimbursement increase will diminish in 2015
and may leave new enrollees with renewed inequities. 80 It is possible that Medicaid
enrollees purchasing insurance from qualified health plans through premium
assistance in the exchanges in waiver states may face less discrimination accessing
care, in which case those demonstration waivers will have served a more important
purpose than the political negotiation and strategizing discussed above. But it is
too soon to know if the cloak of private insurance coverage is enough to facilitate
equal access for Medicaid beneficiaries.
An additional source of inequity is Medicaid providers’ and enrollees’ tenuous
ability to enforce the Medicaid Act against noncompliant states in federal court.
The Supreme Court will hear again the question of whether private parties can
enforce the Medicaid Act by Supremacy Clause actions this term, and the prospects
are dim for continued viability of private actions.81 Just two terms ago, the Court
barely upheld such private actions in Douglas v. Independent Living Center by
allowing HHS to exercise primary jurisdiction and bypassing the Supremacy
Clause question in deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statutory question
of adequate reimbursement in that case. 82 Losing the ability to enforce the terms of
the Medicaid Act through private rights of action would decrease HHS oversight,
as the agency has stated publically that it relies on private actions to alert it to state
mistreatment of the Medicaid program and its providers and beneficiaries. Without
on the ground, de facto private enforcers, HHS would have a much harder job
ensuring that the newly universal program achieves equitable care for its new and
old populations. In recognition of this potential regulatory failure, Congress
incorporated new reporting requirements through the ACA into the Medicaid Act
that require states to report on equal access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries.83
But, HHS has not clearly indicated how it will use state reports to increase equal
access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries.
The universality principle should ensure adequate and equal access to care,

79. Adam S. Wilk, Differential Responses Among Primary Care Physicians to Varying
Medicaid Fees, 50 INQUIRY 296 (2013) (studying evidence of physician uptake due to the increase in
payments).
80. The ACA Primary Care Increase: State Plans for SFY 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 28,
2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/perspective/the-aca-primary-care-increase-state-plans-for-sfy-2015.
81. Exceptional Child Ctr. v. Armstrong, 567 Fed. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83
U.S.L.W. 3077 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-15).
82. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Where There Is a Right, There Must Be
a Remedy (Even in Medicaid), 102 KY. L. J. 327 (2014); Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid
Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513
(2012).
83. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed.
Reg. 26,342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
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but if states refrain from expanding their Medicaid programs for very long, then a
different aspect of equity is also jeopardized. States could sustain the exclusionary
practices in health care that the ACA is meant to end, thereby decreasing equity in
health care access. Though all states will eventually expand (it took many years
for all states to participate in the first iteration of Medicaid fifty years ago), until
they do, health care equity will not be achieved. In addition to harming the health
of low-income residents who would qualify for Medicaid in opt in states, state
reticence to expand could affect private insurance plans. Enrollees often move in
and out of Medicaid due to fluctuations in income, a phenomenon known as churn.
Without Medicaid expansion, the newly eligible population in opt out states will
be sicker when it moves into private insurance through exchanges or employers,
raising costs for all.
D. Universality in Eligibility
Medicaid contains eight statutory categories of eligibility now, with the eighth
being childless adults under the age of sixty-five earning up to 133% of the federal
poverty level—the newly eligible population.84 Medicaid eligibility should be
integrated in light of universality. The categories of eligibility, which were proxies
for policy determinations as to who was considered “deserving” of medical
assistance, are no longer germane. Condensing eligibility into one level, uniform
category would reinforce the philosophy of universality and would complement
the other dimensions of governance, administration, and equity.
Under current law, state Medicaid agencies determine whether an applicant
meets the particular standards for financial eligibility in a given state in light of
their categorical status, a status that is now antiquated and unnecessarily
complicated. Eligibility should be a straightforward financial criterion, with no
discrimination among the poor depending on whether they are pregnant, disabled,
elderly, childless, or something else.
Single category eligibility would require reconsideration of technical
differences between existing categories. For example, the Medicaid Act requires
very specific medical care for children, which should be retained in recognition of
their unique vulnerability. 85 Another example is the optional coverage of pregnant
women earning more than 133% of the FPL that most states provide (median
coverage level was approximately 200% of the FPL as of June 2014). 86 Eligibility

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). The ACA also expanded coverage of poor
children aged 5 to 18 up to 133% of the FPL from 100% of the FPL, but children were already
covered, so this is not new eligibility, just expanded eligibility. See id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2012).
86. Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Levels for Children and NonKAISER
FAM.
FOUND.
(2014),
Disabled
Adults
as
of
April
1,
2014,
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unification should not occur at the expense of patients who have benefitted from
state largess through optional Medicaid coverage. But, if the ACA’s private
insurance reforms succeed over time, then states will not need to cover certain
populations above 133% of the FPL, because they will become privately insured
through employers or be able to purchase individual or small group insurance on
the health insurance exchanges.
Unified eligibility would be a logical conclusion to many aspects of the
ACA’s and Medicaid’s new universality. For example, the “no wrong door”
enrollment facilitated by the ACA, which allows uninsured people to enter into the
health insurance system by submitting one application that will direct them to the
type of insurance coverage that they may acquire given financial circumstance,
would be greatly simplified and enhanced by a single category of eligibility for
Medicaid. 87 Unified eligibility would be consistent with the new universality and
inclusion embodied by the law of Medicaid.
***
In sum, universality suffuses multiple dimensions of Medicaid, diminishing
the program’s fragmentation while also revealing a fragility in the ACA’s
expansion. HHS is engaged in a highly pragmatic set of negotiations with states
that invites expansion in order to cover lives and entrench the new federal policy
of inclusion. Contrariwise, the agency must develop its underused ability to do
more than implore—it can and should enforce the ACA’s statutory principle of
universality and rejection of exclusion. HHS can strengthen Medicaid as it expands
and settles into expansion over the coming years. But, if HHS does not, then
fragmentation in Medicaid will continue, not only to the detriment of enrollees,
but also to the detriment of the program’s finances. 88 Though universality could
appear costly in terms of increasing enrollment, it is also very likely to produce
economic benefits through such effects as streamlining, long term benefits related
to preventive care, and unified policy clarification. 89 Not only is universality the

http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/7993-05-where-are-states-today-factsheet-june-2014.pdf.
87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2201, 124 Stat. 119,
289-91 (2010).
88. States have long struggled to finance Medicaid, especially during economic recessions. See,
e.g., Moon, supra note 69, at 329.
89. See Sherry Glied & Stephanie Ma, How States Stand to Gain or Lose Federal Funds by
Opting In or Out of the Medicaid Expansion, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (2013),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/Dec/1718_Gli
ed_how_states_stand_gain_lose_Medicaid_expansion_ib_v2.pdf (quantifying and explaining why
Medicaid expansion is an economic net gain for most if not all states); Robin Rudowitz et al., Issue
Brief: Implementing the ACA: Medicaid Spending & Enrollment Growth for FY 2014 and FY 2015,
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new law of Medicaid, but regardless of theoretical design, it is economically
sensible too.
CONCLUSION
The elderly and the poor were once in the same bucket; undesirable as
patients, often expensive or complex to treat, and often unable to afford their own
care. The elderly were elevated to Medicare’s social insurance, a program unique
in America’s historically limited redistributive policy, through effective lobbying
that federalized and standardized their benefits. While the principle of inclusion
was codified for the elderly in Medicare in 1965, it took almost another fifty years
to codify the precept that non-elderly people also merit non-exclusionary
coverage. 90 Medicaid’s de facto social insurance is not as stable as Medicare’s,
though, because Medicare beneficiaries do not age out of their coverage and form
a politically cohesive group. From an enrollment standpoint, the Medicaid
population is less consistent than Medicare’s. Further, Medicaid is a different kind
of insurance because of the variation that state participation introduces into the
program.
This essay has explored the shift from fragmentation and exclusion to
universality and inclusion across four different spheres. While this shift is a
positive normative development in health care, an obvious downside to Medicaid’s
new universality is that a person must be very low income to benefit from it.
Another disadvantage of building universality on Medicaid is that it has not been
a particularly stable program, often instead approximating a political hot potato.
Nevertheless, expanding Medicaid has long been on the health reform radar, and
the ACA took considerable steps toward both nationalizing and universalizing
Medicaid. Medicaid’s new universality will be felt not only by the sheer number
of people in the program as it grows over the next several years, but also in the
possible defragmenting effects it will have in the health care system as a whole.
HHS must recognize its key role in effectuating universality, which is now the
law of Medicaid. Centralized guidance with universality as its focal point will help

KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/implementing-the-aca-medicaidspending-issue-brief (Medicaid spending increases in opt out states in 2014-15 will be greater than
in expansion states due to lack of federal funding); Reid Wilson, Study: Refusing Medicaid Expansion
POST
(Dec.
6,
2013),
Will
Cost
States
Billions
of
Dollars,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/12/06/study-refusing-medicaidexpansion-will-cost-states-billions-of-dollars (explaining that states spend more on attempting to
draw new businesses to the state than they will spend on Medicaid expansion).
90. The original Medicaid Act contained a provision that admonished states to expand Medicaid
to everyone who qualified financially by 1975, but the provision was postponed and then repealed.
SMITH & MOORE, supra note 22, at 50.
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this newly inclusive form of medical assistance accomplish the principal
philosophical underpinning of the ACA, which initiates a shared responsibility for
health care, if not fully recognizing health care as a public good. Medicaid’s
transition to universality is a story still in the writing—one that will potentially
shape health care for more than a quarter of Americans for years to come.
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